Scaling carbon capture and storage: from policy support to commercial deployment
Ross Brown, Global Policy Lead for CCS at Shell, discusses global carbon capture and storage (CCS) policies, lessons from Northern Lights and why scaling CCS requires both government support and global cooperation.
Today, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is recognised as one of the pathways for decarbonising sectors where alternatives currently remain limited. But moving from early demonstration projects to global infrastructure requires more than technical readiness: it depends on the right combination of policy frameworks, incentives and collaboration between governments, industry and customers.
Ross Brown, Global Policy Lead for CCS at Shell, has spent much of his career exploring how policy, industry and technology intersect in the global energy transition. With a dynamic background that spans international law, public affairs and carbon management, he brings both a technical and policy perspective to a complex question facing heavy industry and government today: how to scale CCS and develop commercially viable commercial models.
In this interview, Ross reflects on how different regions are approaching CCS policy, what lessons projects like Northern Lights offer for other markets, and why building the right conditions for emitters may ultimately determine whether CCS can move from ambition to large-scale deployment.
The role of policy in scaling CCS
How do policy frameworks differ across regions, and what role can governments play in helping low-carbon technologies move from innovation to large-scale deployment?
Governments play a crucial role in helping low-carbon technologies move from innovation to large-scale deployment, particularly by shaping the market conditions needed to bridge what is often called the “missing middle.” Creating early demand, providing long-term policy certainty and enabling infrastructure are all key to helping technologies like CCS scale.
Given that market structures, resource endowments and political priorities differ across regions, policy frameworks understandably take different forms. These approaches reflect local circumstances rather than a single “right” approach.
In Europe, there is a relatively integrated policy landscape, with a combination of carbon pricing through the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), binding climate targets, sector-specific regulation such as Fit for 55, and industrial support through initiatives like the Green Deal Industrial Plan. Together, these measures provide a coordinated framework for low-carbon investment.
In North America, the approach is more decentralised, combining federal and state or provincial policies. Measures such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law focus on tax credits, grants and loan support to incentivise deployment, while Canada also complements this with a national carbon pricing system.
Across APAC, policy frameworks are more diverse, reflecting different stages of economic development and transition pathways. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and China have developed increasingly sophisticated approaches, often linked to broader industrial strategies and long-term planning. While policy tools vary, there is strong emphasis in many cases on coordination, infrastructure development and strategic sector support.
Across all regions, the common thread is the important role of governments in enabling early markets and reducing risk, particularly for technologies like CCS where upfront investment is high. By aligning policy tools with local market conditions, governments can help accelerate the transition from innovation to widespread deployment.
Stepping back, many low-carbon technologies are still stuck in what’s often called the “missing middle” – the space between innovation and large-scale uptake. That’s where governments have an important role to play in creating early demand. This is particularly relevant for CCS, where such support is crucial to help markets get off the ground.
Where does CCs fit in the wider decarbonisation landscape, and what arguments supports it as an important solution as opposed to a ‘nice to have’?
CCS is one part of the wider decarbonisation agenda. A range of technologies and measures need to be developed and scaled in parallel, but CCS – particularly in the European context – can support industrial competitiveness, bolstering the ability of heavy industries to meet market demand and achieve sustainable profitability. This is important because it enables them to continue operating while reducing emissions, rather than facing decline or relocation.
Most future energy scenarios indicate that some fossil fuel use may continue for a period of time, particularly where alternatives remain limited. Organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have identified carbon capture and storage (CCS) as one of the technologies that may contribute to pathways aimed at reducing emissions.
In many cases it is still cheaper to emit carbon than to capture and store it. What policy tools can help close that cost gap?
Think of CCS policy instruments as a toolbox.
Different countries use different combinations depending on their context. In the United States, tax credits have played a major role in underpinning CCS deployment, partly reflecting the relative ease with which that type of instrument has historically achieved bipartisan approval.
In Europe, we see a broader mix of tools: carbon pricing to incentivise decarbonisation, grants funded through carbon market revenues to support early infrastructure, and mechanisms such as contracts for difference – which support low-carbon projects by guaranteeing a stable price – to bridge the gap between the carbon price and the cost of CCS.
Ross Brown, Global Policy Lead for CCS at Shell“There is no single dominant instrument globally – countries tend to use different policy tools depending on their national context.”
How can policymakers support CCS adoption without putting heavy industry at a competitive disadvantage?
One important mechanism for that is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). In theory, CBAM levels the playing field by reflecting internal carbon pricing externally and helping to ensure that industries operating under carbon pricing regimes are not disadvantaged relative to imports.
It may also encourage CCS adoption beyond the regions where such policies originate.
Lessons from Northern Lights: the path to scale
Northern Lights is seen as a successful example of policy enabling CCS. What made that project possible, in your view?
Norway, where Northern Lights is based, has two key advantages: significant CO₂ storage capacity and a clear political commitment to adopting CCS.
Through the Longship Project – Europe’s first full value chain for capturing, transporting and storing industrial CO₂ – the Norwegian government funded the initial infrastructure and backed the first two emitters (Heidelberg Materials and Hafslund Celsio) so they could join the project. A final investment decision was taken last year on Phase 2 of Northern Lights, which aims to expand its capacity from 1.5 to at least 5 million tonnes of CO₂ per year, supported by commercial agreements and additional infrastructure. The expansion should be completed and ready for operation in the second half of 2028.
This strong government support and advocacy naturally created the conditions for commercialisation, allowing the joint venture partners to move into later phases and attract additional customers. The broader lesson here is that establishing early CCS value chains can help unlock commercial markets.
How mature are the regulatory frameworks governing cross-border CO₂ transport and long-term storage?
It’s essential that I mention the London Protocol here. Introduced by the International Maritime Organisation in 2006, it has been absolutely central in shaping the rules around cross-border CO₂ transport and storage. Historically, it restricted subsea storage across borders because CO₂ was broadly classified as a waste product. That has since changed, with cross-border transport and storage now permitted through bilateral agreements between countries. Several such agreements have already been concluded, including those linked to Norway and the Northern Lights project, and more are expected as CCS hubs develop in regions where storage capacity and emissions sources are geographically separated.
Personally, I would also like to see more bilateral agreements happening in APAC, particularly between storage-constrained countries such as Japan and Korea with abundant-storage countries like Australia and Malaysia.
For long-term stewardship, the widely recognised model is that operators manage monitoring and storage sites while they are operational. After closure, once specific criteria are met or after a defined period, governments assume responsibility – reflecting the reality that public institutions are often better placed to oversee storage over the very long timeframes involved.
How it works and why it matters
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What role do policymakers and industry play in creating the conditions for CCS adoption – both in terms of policy frameworks and public trust?
The most important step is creating the right conditions for CCS value chains to develop and mature. That means clear policy frameworks, greater regulatory certainty and support mechanisms for emitters. If emitters are not incentivised to adopt CCS, there will be no demand for transport and storage infrastructure.
Building that foundation is therefore the first step – physical infrastructure will develop once the right conditions are in place.
At the same time, policymakers and industry need to communicate the societal benefits of CCS. Public engagement is essential wherever projects are developed. When projects come into operation, their benefits should become visible in practice: maintaining industrial competitiveness, creating jobs locally, helping to decarbonise industry and contributing to national climate targets.
Like with most things, there will always be some opposition, but projects in operation are evidence that acceptance can be achieved.
Looking ahead, what would indicate that CCS markets are on the right track?
The key signal will be whether early projects genuinely create the foundations for scale-up. Beyond that, sufficient carbon pricing will be important, particularly in regions such as Europe.
Over time, we would also expect stronger customer demand for decarbonised products. If customers are willing to pay a premium for products such as lower-carbon cement or steel, that strengthens the CCS business case. There’s also potential for carbon dioxide removal markets to grow, both in voluntary and compliance spaces.
Ross Brown, Global Policy Lead for CCS at Shell“Ultimately, the industry needs to evolve beyond mere reliance on the government and develop new business models to ensure the industry can survive and thrive – in a nutshell, scale.”
A personal perspective
How has your background shaped the way you think about climate policy today?
Studying international law has made me more curious and analytical. Embarking on a Masters in carbon management later on gave me a greater understanding of the policy, business and scientific aspects of the energy transition. That combination has been useful because climate policy sits at the intersection of all three.
Eventually I moved from communications roles for shipping and energy companies to public affairs and policy work across the energy and industrial sectors. Moving into a role focused on CCS policy at Shell was a long time coming as I had applied for several roles in the company before, and it finally materialised four years ago.
What keeps you motivated working in climate policy today?
I believe having a full and active life outside of work is important. Creating that balance helps keep me happy and enthusiastic about the work itself.
Ross Brown, Global Policy Lead for CCS at Shell“I often say this job is my dream job – and I genuinely mean it. Being able to work on the policy and practical aspects of CCS, which I find deeply interesting and purposeful, is probably motivation enough.”
Date of publication: July, 2026
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
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