Brent Spar: A new way of doing business

Article from the Shell UK FOCUS magazine (Spring 1998): Senior Shell UK managers put the Brent Spar saga under the microscope.

Shell UK's preferred solution for Brent Spar - re-use as a quay extension in Norway - has been widely welcomed. Although the project still has some way to go, including gaining UK and Norwegian approvals and the huge engineering task itself, Shell UK's decision marked a successful outcome for its new Way Forward strategy, launched after the Spar crisis of 1995. Eric Faulds, Shell Expro's former Decommissioning Manager, and Fran Morrison, Shell in the UK's former Media and Communications Manager, were key players in the events of the last three years. They reflect on what it was all about...

Eric Faulds: After the 1995 decision to halt the sinking, one of the first things we had to do was understand what really happened. We had considered the options in detail, made scrupulous analyses, and identified a disposal plan with the least technical risk, lowest exposure of the workforce to accidents, an insignificant impact on the environment and lowest cost. Why couldn't we carry it out? Was it just because people had been misled by the many inaccurate Greenpeace allegations? It wasn't only that. We realised that our work had essentially followed our normal technical procedure and regulatory compliance, but with limited analysis of potentially wider issues and external sensitivities. In particular, it was seen as a local Scottish, or UK, issue. There was a lack or appreciation that other countries would be interested in our plans and that they would see the issue quite differently.

Shell companies across Europe hadn't foreseen how a plan that was the preserve of a sovereign UK government and of Shell UK could rouse public protest across national borders. And although in the UK we had carried out statutory public consultation, neither we nor the rest of the industry had explained decommissioning widely enough, early enough. When we encountered low initial public interest, we mistakenly assumed that this meant people would not be concerned.

Fran Morrison: Greenpeace used our plan to inflame public feelings about the 'ethics' of waste disposal, and the Spar became a lightning rod for wider concerns about public policy, authority and control. Because the decision-making hadn't been opened up proactively, with explanations, external input and debate, people were more easily misled by exaggerated claims. Shell was aware of Greenpeace's interest, but because the company hadn't used its external 'antennae' too well, the extent of the protest caught us and potential supporters of our case by surprise. We found ourselves on the defensive after a decision, but it's always better to open a discussion, give people the facts, then decide after you've absorbed what others think and feel. People make judgements based on perceptions that don't necessarily match scientific fact - but taking the initiative with good communications can help to get a match between perceptions and fact. When the crisis hit we communicated hard and won more support than some gave us credit for at the time. But we hadn't communicated early enough and in the right way - which means listening too.

Eric Faulds: We had to evolve some new ways of doing business. In today's world, where people don't take government, institutions, business or technical abilities on trust, we had to do much more open communicating, and consulting and listening. With the new Way Forward, we aimed to regain the initiative and lead the agenda, and to resolve matters thoroughly rather than quickly. This would take as long as it needed to take! But first we had to clear the air of Greenpeace allegations about the Spar being a 'toxic time bomb' and so on. So our first step was to commission another independent audit of the Spar's contents, by Det Norske Veritas. If we had gone ahead and sunk the Spar, we would never have been able to show decisively what was true and what was not. We first made sure there was public and Greenpeace buy-in to the audit, so that no-one could challenge the competence of the investigators or later allege invalid methods or bias. When DNV's findings were published in autumn 1995, they showed clearly that our original inventory had been broadly correct, and that Greenpeace had made 'grossly exaggerated'claims. I and my team were always confident in our work methods and it was personally very satisfying to have a respected organisation like DNV confirm that we had carried out our technical analyses in a thorough and professional manner.

Many people remember the Greenpeace apology that autumn, when the pressure group revealed its flawed sampling, and that its claims of the Spar containing "5,500 tonnes of oil" were wrong. Many commentators have doubted whether this would have emerged had Greenpeace not been faced with the imminent results of DNV's audit.

Fran Morrison: There was also a high profile that summer to admissions by leading UK TV companies that in reporting the controversy, they had let Greenpeace "lead them by the nose". I believe many thoughtful discussions of this kind stemmed at least in part from our 'shock' decision to halt the sinking. By calling "halt" to a dramatised controversy, we had helped to enable time and space for a debate on the wider issues. We also began regaining the communications initiative that summer by co-operating in the first of two significant BBC TV documentaries that gave a fuller and more balanced perspective, with widespread screening in the UK and abroad.

Eric Faulds: Timing the Way Forward announcement was important. We launched it in October, 1995, a week before DNV's results, when we did not know what DNV's findings were. This signalled that whether DNV vindicated us or not, we were committed to seeking alternative solutions.

The Way Forward was a competition for the global contracting industry and others to propose alternatives to deep-sea disposal, with fair and open competitive tendering, and no preconceived outcome. It also involved a new, independently facilitated Dialogue, giving us opportunities to listen and giving participants opportunities to question and share views and values. And it involved a highly proactive communications plan, which amongst other objectives, had to communicate complex technical issues in an easy to understand manner. We aimed to achieve a situation where we would be listening to views based on appreciation of the facts rather than misconceptions.

Fran Morrison: The communications plan had two fundamental objectives, to inform and to listen. The end result aimed to be an acceptable solution - but not necessarily a consensus solution - and one that would not be a surprise to anyone. And it wasn't about leave public affairs to the public affairs department; it was run by a closely-knit joint team of our communicators and Eric's line managers. We had to maintain the initiative, and also demonstrate again and again that we had no hidden agenda or solution up our sleeve. We gave high-profile news conferences, interviews, speeches, offshore visits, Shell-authored articles and speeches. All the data, old and new, was published on CD-ROMs, a dedicated Brent Spar Website was launched, we talked to the authors of books, academic theses and case studies, and took part in public meetings, conferences, and an international trade fair in Germany. The global upstream industry also launched a new communications initiative, now called the Offshore Decommissioning Communications Project. It was good that the whole industry also became involved - we had stood alone during the crisis, but decommissioning issues are by no means unique to Shell!

Eric Faulds: It wasn't easy. The UK Government had to approve our choice, and had said any new solution must match or better deep sea disposal. The Government had said deep sea disposal could not be ruled out, but we had to show that we had no hidden agenda for it. We had to operate differently, but also follow the identical Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) methodology as last time. We had to show that the Spar was unique, and not a precedent for any other structure; we had to explain complex regulatory, environmental, safety and technical issues, including new structural engi-neering analysis; and we had to engage over 20 contractors in open proactive communications.

The Dialogue had to bring a wide range of interest groups into a quality debate across Europe, and our sister Shell companies in Europe had to be actively engaged. We did not want to be hostile to Greenpeace but to bring them into the Dialogue. But we also had to replace inaccurate allegations with facts.

Eric Faulds: I believe it has. Our eventual choice is neither deep-sea disposal, nor 'scrap onshore at all costs' as urged during the controversy. We believe that we have demonstrated that our choice is the BPEO, taking account of new circumstances, most importantly the willingness of Norway now to allow work to be carried out there. We showed that it is a unique solution for a unique structure. The explanations and openness achieved 'no surprises'. And it does seem to be an acceptable solution; the UK Government has been amongst many stakeholders who welcomed it.

Fran Morrison: One indication of communications breakthrough came in early 1997, when an independent media evaluation across six European countries showed that Shell had become Europe's leading source of information on decommissioning. The most widely carried media 'messages' included the 'industry is now being open and transparent in its decision making', and 'a balanced view must be taken'. Other indications were the continuously improving quality of debate and comment, the volume of visits to the Spar Website, and the communications award won by one of the Spar CD-ROMs. During Dialogue seminars in Europe, while not abandoning its objections on principle, Greenpeace even conceded that deep-sea disposal would have minimal environmental impact. When the BBC screened a second TV documentary after our announcement, to which we had given unprecedented 'fly on the wall' access for a year, it marked a conclusion to three years of new departures in Shell openness. I hope there will be many more.

Eric Faulds: That in the 'show me' world, we must be more open and transparent. In controversial matters, good science and regulatory compliance aren't enough. We must interest and inform people even if they initially seem to show little interest, and we must explain complex issues, but simply. It's a mistake to underestimate objections on principle, or the commitment of those who make them. Public perceptions may be driven by feelings not facts, and instinctive feelings matter. We must keep devising new ways of sensing external perceptions, and take account of them in business plans. Ironically, being totally open can make it more difficult to raise interest, so that we can listen to the views of others! When you close the door and people can't see what you are doing, then suspicions and interest are aroused. We must build on our Spar experience so that neither we nor interest groups waste money and energy in conflict. We also need to share and understand differing national perspectives. And independent third parties, such as DNV, and The Environment Council who facilitated our Dialogue, can help to build public trust.

Fran Morrison: Sustained, high-profile, proactive communications are resource and time intensive, and need both top management commitment and good chemistry between business managers and the communicators. But I think Shell learned that communicating like this can help to seize and maintain the initiative, and pay measurable dividends. Creating a topical debate isn't necessarily 'dangerous'; it can in fact reduce controversy by helping potentially contentious matters to become familiar.

Eric Faulds: Dialogue isn't magic. It doesn't remove our real responsibility to make our own decisions, and it can't replace legal compliance. But it is a valuable forum for listening, and when we have to make value judgements, dialogue can help us ensure that our corporate values are aligned with those of our stakeholders. It can show we are responsive, and enable debate amongst many parties about each others' positions, as opposed to one-to-one confrontation. This is a most important point; in our dialogue events we put forward the facts, then listened to the participants debate the issues among themselves. Dialogue should start as early as possible in decision-making 'Dialogue-Decide-Deliver' is better and less costly than 'Decide-Announce-Defend'.